Strategic Narrative is a tool that political actors use to construct a shared understanding of the past, present, and future, shape the behaviour of regional and international actors, and extend their influence by explaining who they are and what they want. It is one of the best ways for political actors to survive in a difficult environment. In simple terms, strategic narrative is a way of influencing the behaviour of others. As Freedman writes, “Narratives are designed or nurtured with the intention of structuring the responses of others to developing events.”
Let’s understand this through another example. A paper written by two U.S. servicemen called for a national strategic narrative to address the uncertain future of U.S. foreign policy. In that publication, Anne-Marie Slaughter argues that “a narrative is a story that all Americans can understand and identify with in their own lives. We seek to be a nation that other nations listen to, rely on, and emulate out of respect and admiration.” This connects with one of Joseph Nye’s ideas about soft power: forging a new narrative after the Cold War, giving meaning to foreign policy, and finding a way forward in the new international order. This article is based on my reading and analysis of Miskimmon, O'Loughlin and Roselle's Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order (2017). focusing on how these narratives are constructed, communicated, and contested. It argues that strategic narratives matter because they provide a framework through which international actors and audiences can interpret power, identity, rules, and change in world politics. Before moving on to this article, if you would like to learn more about neoliberalism and state control, you should
Strategic Narratives and International Order
Strategic narratives help us understand how the international order works and how countries and political actors tell stories about who is powerful, what the rules are, and how countries operate in that environment. One of the key points of my findings is that different state actors tell different stories, so they may have different ideas about the same international order. These stories also influence how states operate, so narratives can help create an international order or support changes to it.
Political actors use strategic narratives in an attempt to occupy the centre ground of national and international political communication and play an influential role in constituting the international world order. However, the ability of state actors is not unlimited because they face domestic political pressure, other states, international institutions, and competing narratives. This idea can also be understood through Robert Putnam's idea of the "two level game," in which governments deal with both domestic and international pressure to reach conclusions. This idea is also extensively explained by Peter Gourevitch, who argues that domestic politics are "permeable," meaning that the line between the domestic and international is not fixed and that developments at one level can influence the other.
In this research, I have also found that social media plays a role in spreading strategic narratives at the international level. Nowadays, more actors have come to challenge the narratives of powerful states. Yes, I accept that powerful countries have significant resources to shape interpretations of the international order. But the main question is whether those resources are effective enough for their narratives to be accepted everywhere. I have also found that having a lot of resources does not guarantee that a great power can achieve everything. As Jamieson argues, a successful narrative provides a "plausible, internally coherent story that resonates with its audience while helping explain otherwise fragmented information
However, powerful states have struggled to create one shared narrative to explain the post-Cold War international order. As Freedman observes, there has been a “yearning for a new order,” but no clearly defined international order has replaced the relative stability of the Cold War. Robert Kagan’s argument also explains this problem. Even close allies may not “share a common view of the world.” This means that states can cooperate while still having different ideas about how international affairs should be organized. During the Cold War, narratives such as capitalism versus communism and East versus West provided clear divisions through which international politics could be understood. However, these narratives no longer provide the same shared framework. Hans Morgenthau’s discussion of foreign policy also helps us understand the broader importance of influence and communication in international politics. Morgenthau argues that foreign policy attempts to “influence the will of other governments” in pursuit of important interests. It can use different means, including diplomatic persuasion, military pressure, aid, and trade. These perspectives show that international order is not shaped only by military or economic power. It is also shaped by the narratives through which actors explain the world, communicate their interests, influence audiences, and compete over the meaning of international politics.
Strategic narratives can also help maintain an existing international order by reinforcing ideas about its rules, roles, and legitimacy.
How Strategic Narratives Shape Perceptions
To understand how strategic narratives shape perceptions, the 2011 Libya crisis provides a useful case. In this section, I focus on one case rather than discussing several international events because Libya shows quite clearly how different governments can describe the same crisis in different ways and how these descriptions can influence diplomatic responses. The debate over United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 was not simply a question of whether military intervention should take place. It also reflected different understandings of international order, sovereignty, responsibility, and the proper use of military force. Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle examine the case through the formation, projection, and reception of strategic narratives. France and the United Kingdom developed a narrative that presented the crisis mainly as an urgent threat to Libyan civilians and connected international action with the responsibility to protect them. Germany, in contrast, emphasized the risks and limits of military intervention and gave greater importance to diplomacy and sanctions. These different positions show that the same political situation can acquire different meanings depending on how it is narrated.
The French narrative was particularly visible in the diplomacy surrounding the threat to Benghazi. France presented the situation as one in which there was little time to prevent violence against civilians, and French leaders connected intervention with France’s responsibility to act. Nicolas Sarkozy and Foreign Minister Alain Juppé framed the crisis around the danger faced by the civilian population and the need for timely international action. Sarkozy also presented France as a country willing to accept responsibility and work with Arab, European, and North American partners. In this way, France was not simply describing what was happening in Libya; it was also presenting an idea of what a responsible state should do when civilians are threatened. The French narrative therefore reflected what the authors describe as a form of liberal interventionism, in which powerful states can assume responsibility for protecting people and maintaining security beyond their own borders.
The British narrative was closely connected to the French position, although its tone was somewhat different. The authors describe Britain as occupying a position between French enthusiasm for intervention and German reluctance. British diplomacy focused more on presenting the intervention as a practical and legally justified response to the crisis. The British government emphasized Gaddafi’s actions, the need to protect the Libyan people, regional support through the Arab League, and the authority provided by the United Nations. It also stressed that the operation had specific limits and was not intended to become a foreign occupation. This was important because Britain itself faced public concerns about becoming involved in another prolonged military campaign after Iraq and Afghanistan. Therefore, the British narrative had to connect international responsibility with limits on military involvement.
Germany constructed a substantially different narrative. Rather than presenting military intervention as the immediate answer to the Libyan crisis, German leaders emphasized the risks of escalation, the possibility of a prolonged conflict, and the difficulty of determining whether military objectives could actually be achieved. Germany supported diplomacy and sanctions and was skeptical of treating the responsibility to protect as an automatic justification for military intervention. This position was reflected in Germany’s abstention on Resolution 1973. What I find here is that it connects this narrative to Germany’s longer foreign policy experience, particularly its preference for legally grounded multilateral cooperation and its historical skepticism toward the use of military force as an instrument of foreign policy. In this sense, Germany was not simply rejecting action; it was presenting a different understanding of what responsible international action should mean.
The important point in this case is what happened when these narratives reached other audiences. France and Britain did not simply make their arguments and stop there. They projected their narrative through diplomacy, the United Nations, media statements, and efforts to gain wider regional and international support. They also coordinated their positions and attempted to build a broad coalition around the no-fly zone. This narrative succeeded in influencing the United States, even though President Obama and other US officials had reservations about becoming involved in another overseas military operation. The French and British narrative connected intervention with the United States’ own ideas about leadership and the maintenance of international order, making the proposed action more compatible with the American understanding of its international role.
At the same time, the narrative was not received in the same way by every actor. Germany did not accept the Franco-British interpretation and maintained its opposition to military participation. China and Russia abstained on Resolution 1973, citing concerns about sovereignty, international law, and the limits of military force. Russia questioned how the no-fly zone would actually be enforced and what limits would be placed on the use of force. China accepted some elements of the Franco-British position but remained cautious and emphasized sovereignty, international law, and regional involvement. This is important because it shows that strategic narratives do not automatically control their audiences. A government can construct and project a narrative, but its effect depends on how other actors interpret it in relation to their own interests, identities, experiences, and existing ideas about international order.
The Libya case therefore demonstrates that strategic narratives shape perceptions by giving an international event a particular meaning. France and Britain presented the crisis as a situation in which responsibility toward civilians required international action, while Germany emphasized caution, diplomacy, and the risks of military intervention. These different narratives influenced how governments understood the problem and which responses they considered legitimate or necessary.
Competing Strategic Narratives
From what I understand, strategic narratives can also compete with each other because different actors may have different ways of explaining the same international situation. They do not always see an event in the same way, mainly because their interests and understanding of the international order are different. The Libya case makes this quite clear. France and Britain presented intervention mainly as protection of civilians, while Germany was more concerned about the risks of military action and preferred diplomacy and sanctions. Russia and China also had concerns about sovereignty and the use of force. This shows that international politics is shaped not only by what actually happens, but also by how those events are explained and understood. A narrative may gain support from some audiences while facing resistance from others. Therefore, competition between strategic narratives can influence how an international issue is understood and what actions are considered acceptable or necessary. In this way, narratives can also contribute to maintaining an existing international order or challenging the way that order is understood.
Strategic narratives provide another way of understanding how international order is shaped and understood. From the discussion above, it becomes clear that international politics is not only about material power, military capabilities, or economic interests. The way actors explain international events and communicate their ideas can also influence how those events are understood by others. Miskimmon, O’Loughlin and Roselle show that strategic narratives can help actors explain the international system, promote particular ideas about order, and ...influence how others understand their actions.
For me, this shows that strategic narratives are important because they connect political actions with particular interpretations of what is legitimate, necessary, or responsible in international politics. Therefore, understanding international order also requires attention to the narratives through which actors explain and contest that order.
References
Miskimmon, A., O’Loughlin, B., & Roselle, L. (2017). Strategic narratives: Communication power and the new world order. Routledge.
Quotations from Freedman, Kagan, Morgenthau, Jamieson, Putnam and Gourevitch are taken from Miskimmon et al. (2017).
Caught between Kosovo and Iraq: Understanding Germany’s abstention on Libya
(The London School Of Economics & Political Science)
