Why Italy's Oil Escaped League of Nations Sanctions in 1935

 

Mussolini invaded Ethiopia (then also called Abyssinia) on 3 October 1935. Italian forces crossed from Eritrea, then an Italian colony, into northern Ethiopia and also attacked from Italian Somaliland in the south. Why did the League of Nations fail to stop Italy from invading Ethiopia? What was Mussolini’s greatest fear? The League did impose economic sanctions against Italy, but how effective were they? We will discuss this later. The Italo-Ethiopian War marked the death of the League and the disintegration of collective security as a whole. Historian A. J. P. Taylor expressed this view forcefully, arguing that “the real death of the League” occurred in December 1935, not in 1939 or 1945.

In this article, we will examine the League’s sanctions, the oil question, and the reasons behind its decisions.

The Italian Invasion and League Sanctions

planning against Italy fascist regime was started before Ethiopia invasion when invasion started all the countries around the world expected that genva should take action against Italy to stop its aggression and obvison choice article 16 if that was implemented its direct target will be the Italian Mussolini regime at the annual assemble on 11 September both French prime minister Laval and british secretary for league affairs Anthony Eden publicly announced their intentions of economic sanctions against Italy if they attacked when Italy atatcked league activated its economic weapon after 3 weeks of attack its under secretary general in Irishman Sean lester described it as a "greatest experiment in the modern history". One thing would clarify here: the League's sanctions did not stop Italy from invading Ethiopia to save Emperor Haile Selassie's throne, and Italy got victory in Ethiopia. 

Britain and France mainly restricted Italy’s access to money and its ability to buy goods from other countries, rather than directly blocking important resources such as oil, which I will discuss later. The League of Nations tried to weaken Italy by restricting its finances and foreign trade, making it difficult for the country to earn money through international commerce. These measures were used against Italy because it was a large, industrialised country with an expansionist military and colonies. Therefore, the Co-ordination Committee imposed one of the first economic sanctions in modern history against Italy. However, these sanctions were ineffective because, according to the Treasury theory, you can block a country’s access to money but cannot control the resources it can produce for itself.

Why Was Oil Excluded?

Another important point was the way British and French policymakers understood economic sanctions. They mainly believed that if they could reduce Italy’s foreign exchange and its ability to earn money from international trade, they could put pressure on Mussolini and make the war more difficult for him. This was different from directly blocking the resources that Italy needed for its military. An oil embargo was discussed and proposed, but it was never fully implemented. Mussolini was also afraid of this possibility because he understood that stopping oil supplies could seriously affect his military campaign in Africa. However, British and French planners were more interested in gradually creating financial pressure than in immediately blocking important resources. This approach made the sanctions less direct and gave Italy more time to continue the war. In this way, the oil question became one of the biggest weaknesses of the League’s sanctions against Italy.

Why Sanctions Failed

There are different reasons why the League sanctions failed. First was the late response of the League, France, and British policymakers. Three weeks after Mussolini’s attack on Ethiopia, they activated economic sanctions. Italy was able to prepare stocks and find ways around some of the economic pressure. Between November 1935 and July 1936, Italian exports fell from £59 million to £37.7 million, a reduction of about 35%. Italian imports also fell by 22%. It did hurt the economy, but it did not prevent Italy from conquering Ethiopia. 

The Failure Of Collective Security

The Italo-Ethiopian War revealed the limits of collective security in the League of Nations. The League succeeded in bringing many countries together and imposing economic pressure on Italy, but the pressure was not strong enough to prevent the conquest of Ethiopia. Britain and France were unwilling to take measures that could have led to a more direct confrontation with Mussolini, while the United States remained outside the League and pursued its own policies. As Nicolas Mulder explains, the sanctions did not simply disappear without effect; they seriously damaged the Italian economy and forced the Fascist government to make difficult choices. But the crisis also showed that collective security depended on countries being willing to act together beyond their own interests. When that unity weakened, the League struggled to turn international agreement into effective action.

Conclusion

The failure of sanctions against Italy was not simply a failure of economic pressure, but also of international cooperation. Britain and France attempted to use the League of Nations to defend collective security while still protecting their own strategic interests. Their experience of the costly blockade during the First World War, along with fears of a wider conflict and the shifting balance of power in Europe, limited their willingness to take stronger measures against Mussolini. The absence of American cooperation further weakened the sanctions, especially over oil. The crisis therefore revealed a fundamental contradiction in the League's system: collective security depended on the cooperation of powerful states, yet those same states were unwilling to risk their national interests to enforce it. The Italian invasion of Ethiopia demonstrated that international agreements alone could not guarantee peace when the major powers lacked a common willingness to act.

References

Mulder, N. (2018). The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War. Yale University Press.