How Does Eurocentrism Influence the Way International Theory Explain World Politics

 

How Does Eurocentrism Influence the Way International Theory Explain World Politics

Today, much of international theory, developed over the past 300 years presents politics and the world from a Eurocentric perspective. In simple words, rather than explaining world politics objectively and universal way, international theory gives the West a central role in world affairs and in the political and social development of the world. In “The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics,” Hobson uses the term “Eurocentrism” in the plural because it does not have only one form. These theories differ from one another. Different theories present Europe as advanced and superior in different ways. Some oppose imperialism, while others support it. Those who oppose imperialism may still support the idea of Western superiority as a path toward development or success that other nations should follow. So, the key point is that opposing imperialism does not mean that the thinking moves beyond Eurocentric thought. Therefore, the central research question of this article is : How does Eurocentrism shape explanations of world politics in international theory? 

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Eurocentrism in International Theory

Eurocentrism in International Relations is not merely a matter of assigning greater attention to Europe. Its more profound issue lies in the way European historical experience is elevated into a universal template for interpreting political development across the globe. When international theory explains state formation, political order, or the structure of the international system, it often treats Western experience as its primary point of reference. In doing so, it can present Europe’s historical trajectory as though it were a natural and universal path for all societies, despite the fact that other regions possess distinct histories and political traditions of their own.

An important aspect of this problem is that it does not always manifest itself through explicit defence of imperialism or overt claims of racial superiority. At times, it operates more subtly through the very concept of development. A thinker may reject colonial domination and endorse the political independence of non-Western societies, yet still assume that these societies will ultimately reproduce the same institutions and political arrangements that emerged in the West. In that sense, Western control is challenged, but Western development remains the benchmark against which all progress is judged.

A historical example illustrates this point clearly. Haiti declared independence in 1804 after a revolution against French colonial rule and slavery. Even so, France refused to recognise Haitian independence until 1825, when it imposed a demand that Haiti pay 150 million francs as compensation to former French colonists. France later reduced this sum in 1838, while the United States did not extend recognition until 1862. These events demonstrate that formal sovereignty did not necessarily translate into immediate or equal acceptance within the international system.

This case therefore raises a fundamental question: if states are supposedly equal members of the international system, why did Haiti encounter such obstacles to recognition? It reminds us that international relations cannot be adequately understood through the experiences and assumptions of powerful Western states alone. We must also examine how other societies encountered the international system and how power shaped their standing within it.

From Western Experience to Universal Theory

By examining theories of international relations like realism, liberalism, Marxism, and constructivism, we find that these theories offer different explanations of world politics. However, if we examine them from a non-European perspective, we find similarities that place the West at the centre of power. realism focus on state interests and competition between states, while liberalism focuses on international institutions and economic cooperation. Despite their differences, some influential versions of these theories share a Western-centred perspective. For example, they explain why states compete for power or follow international rules, but may pay less attention to how European colonialism and imperialism helped shape the unequal international order in which states operate. Marxism, for example, criticises capitalism and imperialism, yet it can still treat Europe’s path of capitalist development as the model other societies will follow. Constructivism, which focuses on ideas and identity, has often paid little attention to how colonial history shaped those identities and norms. This is why I argue that some influential versions of these theories may share Eurocentric assumptions.

Sovereignty/Anarchy Myth

Sovereignty generally means that a state has legal authority over its territory and government, while anarchy in international relations means that there is no central authority above all states. The international system consists of sovereign states, but does this explanation give us the full picture? The usual account says that sovereign equality began in Europe around 1648 and then spread to the rest of the world. But in practice, European powers did not treat non-European societies as equals. Many were colonised, forced into unequal treaties, or denied full recognition as sovereign states. So the system was never simply anarchic and made up of equals; it contained hierarchy, with Western powers holding authority over others.

International relations should be understood not only through relations between states but also through the broader social and political conditions in which states were created. This hierarchy is why some states are powerful and have a great deal of influence, while weaker nations face pressure and intervention from powerful states.

The Standard Of Civilization

The Standard of Civilization was a model used by European powers to judge which countries were “civilized” and politically acceptable. Historically, Europeans treated their own model as the standard that others should follow, as seen in the British Empire’s so-called “civilizing mission.” Under this standard, non-European states were treated as fully sovereign only if they met European expectations of law, order, and “civilised” behaviour. Countries such as China, Siam, and the Ottoman Empire were pressed into unequal treaties and extraterritorial arrangements until Western powers judged that they had met the standard. In this way, sovereignty was not simply a right all states shared; it was something Western powers could grant or withhold, as Haiti’s experience also shows.

The Limits of a Western Centred Perspective

One important issue in international relations is the belief that theories can explain world politics in an objective and universal way. Hobson addresses this through the idea of the “positivist myth” of international theory. Put simply, this is the assumption that international relations can be studied as a neutral science, free from values or assumptions. But it is worth asking whether any theory can truly be universal if it mainly draws on the historical experience of Western societies to explain how the rest of the world works. A theory may still be useful, but that does not mean its ideas fit every society in the same way.

This problem becomes clearer when countries are judged according to their political and historical development. If the Western experience is treated as the normal route to progress, then societies that developed differently can seem less advanced or simply different from what is expected. In reality, those differences may come from their own historical circumstances, including colonial rule and their relationships with powerful states. The issue, in my view, is not just that Western experiences are included in international theory. It is that they often become the main standard through which other societies are measured.

Hobson’s discussion of the " Fool’s Cap World Map" also raises an important point about how the world is represented. A map is usually seen as a simple way of showing geography, but the way it presents the world can shape how we think about different regions. This connects with the distinction between the geographical and ideational dimensions of the East–West divide. The geographical dimension refers to physical location, while the ideational dimension refers to the meanings and assumptions attached to those regions. East and West are therefore not only labels for places; they can also suggest ideas about civilisation, rationality, or political development. In this way, representation affects how societies are understood in international politics.

This is why international theory needs to be examined critically. When one way of understanding the world becomes accepted as universal, its assumptions can stop being questioned. The experiences of societies outside the West may then receive less attention, even though they are essential for understanding how the international system developed. I would not argue that Western theories should be rejected outright. Instead, they should be read alongside the histories and experiences of other societies. That approach gives a fuller picture of world politics and avoids treating the development of one region as the model for everyone else.

Eurocentrism shapes international theory by privileging Western historical experience and intellectual tradition. While realism, liberalism, and related schools offer important insights, they can understate the enduring effects of colonialism, power asymmetries, and uneven political development. Questions of sovereignty, the Standard of Civilization, and the limits of universal knowledge show that world politics cannot be understood through a single historical lens. Western theories remain useful, but their assumptions require close scrutiny. A broader range of historical experience yields a more complete account of world politics.

References

Hobson, J. M. (2012). The Eurocentric conception of world politics: Western international theory, 1760–2010. Cambridge University Press.

Gaillard-Pourchet, G.-K. (2023). Haiti’s Independence Debt: The Slave as a Unit of Account (1794–1922). Bibliothèque nationale de France.

U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian. A Guide to the United States’ History of Recognition, Diplomatic, and Consular Relations, by Country, Since 1776: Haiti.

About the author
SIKANDAR KHAN

I'm Sikandar Khan, an M.Phil. student in International Relations at the University of Peshawar. I did my bachelor's in Pakistan Studies at Islamia College, Peshawar, where I researched Pakistan-United States relations from 1947 to 1955. I write The Hectorica to explain foreign policy and history in clear language.

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