The nuclear bomb is one of the most devastating weapons humanity has ever produced. During World War II, the secret Allied Manhattan Project built an atomic bomb. Shortly after, it was used against the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, and these two attacks claimed 200,000 lives, not including those who suffered from radiation over decades. Shortly after that, in 1949, the Soviet Union also detonated its own bomb. And more interestingly, what happened after that was the increase in US nuclear stocks from 300 in 1950 to 18,000 in the 1960s and 31,000 in 1965. It was a huge nuclear arsenal, far larger than the Soviet nuclear arsenal at that time. As both countries developed more powerful nuclear weapons, protecting themselves became increasingly connected to the fear of retaliation from the other side. But here is the question: Can a country’s efforts to protect itself with nuclear weapons actually make both countries less safe?
Read more: How the Cold War Redefined Eastern Europe
Why Did Mutual Vulnerability Become a Source of Security?
The huge race between the Soviets and the Americans started in the late 1940s. The U.S. Air Force and Navy stressed the importance of air-strike capabilities and aircraft carriers. The U.S. government moved toward supporting the Air Force by advancing the B-36 bomber while canceling the supercarrier program. Look at these details: from the 1950s to the 1970s, the U.S. Navy had 20 aircraft carriers, 30 cruisers, 250 destroyers, and 100 of submarines. On the other hand, the Soviets were also in this race. They reverse-engineered the American B-29 as the Tupolev Tu-4. However, their lack of forward bases from which to strike the U.S. homeland pushed the Soviets to develop new long-range jet bombers, such as the Myasishchev M-4 Molot (“Hammer”), known in the West as the “Bison”. At least, it created panic in the U.S. that the Soviets had closed the bomber gap (Jenkins, 2021, pp.61-62).
In missile technology, both competed with each other. The United States focused on medium-range missiles that could hit an enemy on the battlefield, and in 1960, they also deployed new Jupiter missiles. On the other hand, the Soviet focus turned toward long-range missiles that could hit the enemy’s homeland. With the help of the brilliant Soviet rocket engineer Sergei Korolev, the Soviets made advances and created the R-7 Semyorka, with an initial range of 3,700 miles. Later models extended this range to 5,500 miles. This was the world’s first intercontinental ballistic missile (Jenkins, 2021, pp.62-63).
To overcome the risk of their missiles being destroyed on land by the Soviets, the Americans created a third delivery system. For your understanding, I will use my own term for this: “The Grand Deep-Sea Strategy.” This meant attacking from the sea using submarines, with their locations remaining unknown to the enemy. In the mid-1950s, advances in nuclear propulsion - a development associated with Admiral Hyman Rickover, known as the “Father of the Nuclear Navy” ensured that these vessels could stay underwater for long periods and attack at any time (Jenkins, 2021, pp.63-64).
Both had powerful technology capable of destroying the other, so the Soviets and the U.S. deterred war through a balance of terror. They were clear in their thinking that such a war would annihilate their societies.
When Does the Pursuit of Security Become a Threat?
The US and the Soviet Union developed weapons and defence systems against each other, but those defences also raised strategic dilemmas. Why? Look at the missile defence systems designed to protect US Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) fields from incoming nuclear attacks. The United States also established an extensive radar network, including the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS), to detect incoming Soviet ICBMs. Meanwhile, the Arctic Ocean became a battleground where US nuclear submarines tracked Soviet submarines and prepared to destroy them in the event of war. The existence of such advanced defence systems on both sides created what I can call a Chain Reaction (Jenkins, 2021, p.64).
So, they also developed systems to defeat or deceive anti-ballistic missile defences. The idea was simple: the smarter those systems became, the more they could threaten the nuclear balance of terror. To explain it simply, both sides were thinking that stronger nuclear defences could sometimes make war more likely rather than prevent it. During the Cold War, both states feared that a war against each other would cause massive destruction. For that reason, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 1972 limited anti-ballistic missile defence systems and it did not prohibt every missile defence system. Why was this such a serious concern for both powers? On several occasions, technical faults or disruptions to electrical supplies created false indications that the enemy had begun a nuclear attack (Jenkins, 2021, pp.64,68-69).
One example was in May 1967, when a solar storm led US military officials to suspect that the Soviets were jamming their radars. Another was in 1961, when a US B-52 bomber broke apart and dropped two hydrogen bombs near Goldsboro, North Carolina, raising serious concerns about accidental detonation. In another incident, a B-52 released nuclear bombs over Palomares, Spain, causing radioactive contamination. Near Thule, Greenland, a B-52 carrying four hydrogen bombs crashed, spreading radioactive material (Jenkins, 2021, pp.68-69).
These incidents raise a question: if such accidents could happen without Soviet involvement, could a similar incident be mistaken for a Soviet attack and lead to retaliation?