Aurangzeb's Alliances: How Religion and Power Shaped His Politics

Article cover for “Aurangzeb’s Alliances: How Religion and Power Shaped His Politics

 During the Mughal war of succession between the two princes from (1657 to 1659), Aurangzeb and Dara Shukoh divided the Hindu elites into two groups. Many Rajputs supported Dara Shukoh, while the Marathas, who were becoming a growing and formidable power, supported Aurangzeb. Thus, both princes gained support from the elites. From the perspective of the Mughal elite, and I am talking about both Muslims and Hindus, Aurangzeb was considered a smart choice for the throne because Hindu nobles had limited opportunities to rise during the reigns of Akbar and Shah Jahan, while their influence increased during Aurangzeb’s reign compared to the reigns of Akbar and Shah Jahan. Looking further at both Shivaji and Aurangzeb, I found that Shivaji cooperated with the Mughals and other Islamic states, such as Golconda, while Aurangzeb relied on Hindu commanders. Therefore, in this article, I am going to discuss what shaped alliances in Aurangzeb’s India and why cooperation across religious boundaries sometimes gave way to conflict.

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Aurangzeb and Hindu Nobles

At the time of Aurangzeb Alamgir, Hindus enjoyed a favourable position in the massive Mughal bureaucracy. Like their Muslim counterparts, they were also promoted to the highest ranks. According to Audrey Truschke, Emperor Aurangzeb used a practical strategy by adding more Hindus to the Mughal bureaucracy, and sometimes he was less concerned about the religious identity of his officials. His primary focus was their skills and the administration of his vast empire (Truschke, 2017, p.62).

I would use this example of Aurangzeb to show how practical he was in administration. In the time of Akbar, Hindus constituted 22.5% of Mughal nobles, and that did not go too high even in Shah Jahan's time. But from 1679 to 1707, he increased the role of Hindu elites in the Mughal court to 31.6% of the entire Mughal nobility. Another strong example is Raja Raghunatha. Aurangzeb appointed Raja Raghunatha to his diwani as the chief finance minister of the Mughal Empire. His influence outstripped his high office, and the French traveller Bernier described him as an acting vizier of the Mughal Empire (Truschke, 2017, pp.63-64).

One Muslim from Bukhara in the late 1680s petitioned Aurangzeb, saying that he should not promote a Shia. He rejected the proposal and said, “What connection do earthly affairs have with religion?” By reading Aurangzeb's history, I would clearly say that he was more practical. His decisions had nothing to do with religion when it came to loyalty and skilful people. There is no doubt that he was religious, but he did not judge people by their religion (Truschke, 2017, p.65).

Shivaji's Changing Political Alliances

To understand Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj’s alliances, we would go back to 1665, when Aurangzeb sent his most capable leader, Raja Jai Singh, a Hindu Rajput, who defeated Shivaji at Purandar Fort. Shivaji accepted Mughal authority and became a vassal of the Mughal Empire. In addition to that, in May 1666, Shivaji visited Aurangzeb’s court in Agra with gifts and bowed before Aurangzeb. However, Shivaji felt insulted possibly because he thought that Aurangzeb had placed him among the lower-ranking nobility. He protested and was put under house arrest. After some time, he fled from Agra, and in 1669, Shivaji again started attacking the Mughals and challenging their authority (Truschke, 2017, pp. 66-67).

Shivaji’s political partnerships were not limited to rulers who shared his religious background. He worked with Bijapur, Golconda, and, at certain times, even the Mughals when their interests happened to align with his own. Muslims also served in his army and administration, with some holding senior military positions. In my view, these examples make it difficult to describe the conflict simply as Hindus fighting Muslims, since political interests often mattered more than religious identity (Truschke, 2017, p. 69).

There is another point worth considering here. The contrast between Shivaji and the Hindu nobles who served Aurangzeb suggests that the real disagreement centred on the acceptance of imperial authority. Religious differences did not always prevent cooperation, but that cooperation could easily fall apart when questions of status and submission came into play. Shivaji’s unsuccessful accommodation with the Mughals therefore shows one of the limits of Aurangzeb’s approach. Bringing an opponent into imperial service might create a temporary arrangement, but it did not necessarily win that person’s lasting loyalty (Truschke, 2017, pp. 66 - 69).

Aurangzeb and the Rajputs Cooperation: and Resistance

The Marwar conflict after 1678 should not be understood simply through loyalty or religion. Aurangzeb’s intervention following Jaswant Singh Rathor’s death, especially the occupation of Jodhpur and the proposal to raise the infant heirs at court, directly threatened Marwar’s control over its succession. Mewar’s support for the Rathors was therefore a strategic response to the fear of similar imperial interference (Truschke, 2017, pp. 59-60).

Prince Akbar’s decision to join the Rajputs and declare himself emperor at Nadol in January 1681 gave the conflict wider political importance. His rebellion shows that groups with different ambitions could unite against Aurangzeb’s authority. I would therefore argue that succession and regional autonomy were the main causes of Rajput resistance, although religion remained part of the wider political context. The two kingdoms did not follow the same path in the end. In June 1681, Azam Shah negotiated the Treaty of Rajsamudra, which brought lasting peace between Mewar and the Mughals. Marwar, however, continued to resist direct imperial control. If we look at both cases, it seems that rulers did not simply choose peace or war for the same reasons. Their decisions depended a lot on local circumstances and the pressures they faced at the time (Truschke, 2017, pp. 60-61).

Aurangzeb’s alliances show that religion was not the only factor shaping political loyalty. Hindu nobles served in his government, Shivaji worked with people across religious lines, and Rajput rulers responded to Mughal rule in different ways. These examples show that people often cooperated to protect their power, position, and regional independence, but resisted when these interests were threatened.

References

Truschke, A. (2017). Aurangzeb: The man and the myth. Penguin Books.

About the author
SIKANDAR KHAN

I'm Sikandar Khan, an M.Phil. student in International Relations at the University of Peshawar. I did my bachelor's in Pakistan Studies at Islamia College, Peshawar, where I researched Pakistan-United States relations from 1947 to 1955. I write The Hectorica to explain foreign policy and history in clear language.

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